Günnur Ege Bilgin

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Working Papers

• Placement with Assignment Guarantees and Semi-Flexible Capacities (joint with Orhan Aygün)
  We analyze an extension of the many-to-one placement problem, where some doctors are exogenously guaranteed a seat at a program, which defines a lower bound on their assignment. Respecting assignment guarantees, combined with the limited capacities of programs often violates fairness and leaves more preferred doctors unemployed. In pursuance of restoring fairness, a designer often has to deviate from the target capacities of programs, and imposing the traditional notion of fairness results in excessive deviations from the target capacities. In order to prevent excessive deviations, we introduce two notions that are tailored to the environment: q-fairness and avoiding unnecessary slots. Furthermore, we introduce the Assignment-Guarantees-Adjusted Mechanism (AGAM) and show that it is the unique strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies q-fairness and avoids unnecessary slots whilst respecting assignment guarantees. Furthermore, among the mechanisms that satisfy q-fairness and respect guarantees, AGAM minimizes the deviation from the target capacities.
  
  

• Decentralized Many-to-One Matching with Bilateral Search
  In this paper, I analyze a finite decentralized many-to-one search model, where firms and workers meet randomly. In line with the existing literature, stable matchings of the many-to-one market can be enforced as search equilibria. However, in many-to-one search, firms collect workers in a cumulative manner. For this reason, unlike centralized matching markets, the collective structure of the firms affects the search process fundamentally. Furthermore, although stability in many-to-one markets can be analyzed through their related one-to-one markets, the many-to-one search model is essentially different from its related one-to-one counterpart. One sufficient condition for the equilibria in many-to-one markets to coincide with the equilibria of the related one-to-one market is that firms have additively separable utility over workers. The equilibria also coincide if time is costless for the agents. The paper provides a new matching matrix formulation for many-to-one matchings as well, which is more suitable in environments where matches evolve over time and there are complementarities between workers.
  
  

Work in Progress

• Voting under Salience Bias and Strategic Extremism (joint with Cavit Görkem Destan)
  In the last decade, we have seen populist leaders in many countries such as the USA, Hungary, and Brazil following extreme policies. While most theories suggest that moving to the center from the extremist policies would increase the vote share, moderation does not occur. We believe that limited attention can explain the recent extremism. We create a model of voters with limited attention and the unique equilibrium is extremism in at least one policy. We also show via empirical evidence such that voters focus more on extreme policies and overweight the importance of those issues. 

• 2021/2022 EC 101 - Introduction to Microeconomics at Bogazici University Summer School

• 2020/2021 EC 101 - Introduction to Microeconomics at Bogazici University Summer School