Günnur Ege Bilgin

Welcome! I am a Ph.D. student in Economics at the University of Bonn.

My main research field is microeconomic theory, with a particular interest in applied theory such as matching, political economy and applied mechanism design.

Email: ege.bilgin@uni-bonn.de

Curriculum Vitae


Working Papers

Available upon request

  • School Choice Meets Student Placement: Priorities, Fairness, and Semi-Flexible Capacities (joint with Orhan Aygün)
    We analyze a special case of the student placement problem, where students have a centralized exam score as well as they're exogenously prioritized at some programs, which defines a lower bound on their assignment. We show that preserving priorities, combined with limited capacities of programs is incompatible with fairness. As a result, if a designer aims to respect the priorities as well as fairness, creating additional capacities is inevitable. However, it usually is undesirable to deviate from the target capacities, and the traditional notion of fairness results in excessive deviations from the target capacities. In line with preventing unnecessary additional capacities, we define a relaxed notion of fairness. With capacity respecting fairness (q-fairness), a candidate who is ranked within the original capacity of a program among the application pool is never assigned to a worse alternative. We also define the q-fair Modified Choice Function for programs and show that the deferred acceptance algorithm induced by the q-fair Modified Choice Function produces a stable outcome, is strategy-proof, and minimizes the deviation from the target capacities of the programs.

  • Decentralized Many-to-One Matching with Bilateral Search
    In this paper, I analyze a finite decentralized many-to-one search model, where firms and workers meet randomly. In pursuance of adapting the many-to-one matching markets in the search environment, I introduce a new assignment matrix for the centralized markets. In line with the existing literature, stable matchings of the many-to-one market can be enforced as search equilibria. However, in many-to-one search, firms collect workers in a cumulative manner. For this reason, unlike centralized matching markets, the collective structure of the firms affects the search process fundamentally. Furthermore, although stability in many-to-one markets can be analyzed through their related one-to-one markets, the many-to-one search model is essentially different from its related one-to-one counterpart. One sufficient condition for the equilibria in many-to-one markets to coincide with the equilibria of the related one-to-one market is that firms have additively separable utility over workers.

Work in Progress

  • Voting under Salience Bias and Strategic Extremism (joint with Cavit Görkem Destan)
    In the last decade, we have seen populist leaders in many countries such as the USA, Hungary, and Brazil following extreme policies. While most theories suggest that moving to the center from the extremist policies would increase the vote share, moderation does not occur. We believe that limited attention can explain the recent extremism. We create a model of voters with limited attention and the unique equilibrium is extremism in at least one policy. We also show via empirical evidence such that voters focus more on extreme policies and overweight the importance of those issues.


  • 2021/2022 EC 101 - Introduction to Microeconomics at Bogazici University Summer School

  • 2020/2021 EC 101 - Introduction to Microeconomics at Bogazici University Summer School