We study a re-placement problem where initial assignments must be preserved while score corrections, fairness, and limited capacities all need to be reconciled.
MatchingMarket designHealthcareAssistant Professor · TED University
Curious about how people find their place.
I am an economist working on microeconomic theory, matching theory, market design, and political economy.

A matching market is a market in which prices don't do all the work. So matching markets are markets in which you can't just choose what you want even if you can afford it – you also have to be chosen. - Alvin Roth
My work analyzes ways to allocate scarce opportunities - from residency positions to seats in a classroom.
Selected work
Research
Theory in conversation with real institutions and the people moving through them.
I propose random serial dictatorship as a simpler, more transparent alternative to Türkiye’s current mechanism for assigning doctors to mandatory service positions.
Strategy-proofnessAllocationI analyze many-to-one matching with search frictions and show how multiple vacancies allow firms to withhold capacity and sometimes sustain unstable, firm-preferred outcomes.
Read the paper ↗We introduce a mechanism for placement environments where some participants have assignment guarantees and programs can flex their capacities.
Read the paper ↗We show how limited attention and issue salience can lead electoral candidates toward strategically extreme positions, even when voters are moderate.
Read the paper ↗In the classroom
Teaching
Introduction to Microeconomics
TED UniversityIntermediate Microeconomics
TED UniversityGraduate Microeconomics
TED UniversityMatching Theory & Market Design
TED UniversityGet in touch